Cash in Hand, Questions in the Air: Who Controls the Money, and Will Voters Trust It?*

*Cash in Hand, Questions in the Air: Who Controls the Money, and Will Voters Trust It?*

By Daniel Ogirisen 

*This is a commentary. The facts come from official figures, World Bank reporting, and press coverage. The argument is the author's reading of them.*

Direct cash payments to poor households have become the government's main answer to rising living costs. With the 2027 election approaching, the programme is a test of whether welfare can win votes. My view is that the scale of the payments is not the real issue. The issue is who controls the money, and whether anyone outside government can check where it went.

*Money that is not your own*

When politicians control empowerment funds, they have reason to steer them toward supporters. The money is public, the cost of misdirecting it is hard to see, and the people making the decisions do not pay for mistakes. The economist Milton Friedman is often quoted as observing that nobody spends somebody else's money as carefully as he spends his own. Put simply, every layer of officials between the Treasury and the household is another place where money can be captured, and every unpublished list is a place where capture can hide.

That is a principle, not a finding. But it explains why the allegations keep coming back.

*What the figures agree on*

The government and the World Bank broadly agree on scale. The government reports ₦658.9 billion paid to 10.46 million households by September 2026, and the World Bank's October update cites the same total. Dividing the amount by the households gives about ₦63,000 per household, below the ₦75,000 full package. Many households have received some payments but not all of them.

The World Bank accepts the progress but says the programme needs to reach more households, pay more, pay more regularly, and become a permanent system rather than a series of emergency payments. I agree with that assessment. It is the most useful sentence in the official record.

Unanswered Questions 

The complaints are specific, and they have not been answered.

The government reported 15 million households reached in July and "slightly over 10 million" in August. Atiku Abubakar's camp has asked where the difference went. The rights group HURIWA wants a breakdown of beneficiaries by state and local government and the criteria used to select them. HEDA has warned that payments without a published beneficiary list risk becoming political patronage.

Some residents have said the same locally. A September report by Parrot Nigeria quoted one resident who believed most recipients in his area were party members, while another said beneficiaries came from across political lines. The government says political affiliation does not shape the register. That may be true, but without published lists, no one can test it.

The audit adds weight to the concern. The Auditor-General could not verify ₦33.75 billion paid to 3.29 million households in 2023, citing missing beneficiary records and payment statements. The National Cash Transfer Office disputes the finding and says it shared the records with auditors. Both positions can be tested only if the records can be produced and checked by someone outside the office.

*The ₦50,000 relief and the timing problem*

On October 30, 2026, the minister announced the National Emergency Relief and Stabilisation Intervention (NERSI), offering ₦50,000 to poor and vulnerable households. He described it as monthly. The official webpage describes it as one-off. No duration or funding source has been announced.

Nigerians are not ungrateful for ₦50,000. For a family that has not eaten well in days, it matters. But a relief programme that starts months before an election, and that is not clearly defined, will be read as an election measure. Even if the intentions are good, the government is giving its critics the argument.

*The risk for the ruling party*

The scheme may help the government where payments are regular and visible. But the incentive problem described above cuts against it. The more the payments look like someone else's money being spent for political gain, the more the government risks losing trust, and trust is harder to rebuild than a payment is to make.

A household that is paid may credit the government and its candidate. A household that is left out, or that hears the verification complaints, may see the same payments as selective. Both reactions are rational, and the government's own practices, not its opponents' rhetoric, will decide which one prevails.

*What should be done*

The fix does not require new technology. It requires:

- Publishing beneficiary numbers by state, ward, and local government, along with the selection criteria.

- Independent verification of a sample of payments, with the results made public.

- A fixed payment schedule, announced in advance, so recipients can plan and critics can check.

- Keeping the register out of the hands of anyone seeking elected office.

Other countries have shown that this can work. Kenya's GiveDirectly study, Togo's digital Novissi programme, Ghana's LEAP registry, Ethiopia's Productive Safety Net, and South Africa's Child Support Grant each rely on rules, lists, and predictable payments rather than announcements. None is perfect, but each is more credible than a programme whose beneficiaries cannot be named.

*Will Voters Buy it?*

Polls consistently place cost of living first and security close behind. Electricity has emerged as a major concern too. Cash responds to the first, but not to the second, and I found no published poll that asks voters directly how the payments affect their choice of candidate.

A household that receives a payment on time will see the government as responsive. But a household that sees the list kept private, the figures change, and the timing align with the campaign will reasonably ask whether it was chosen for loyalty. That question is more damaging to the ruling party than any opposition speech.

Security may outweigh it all. A June 2026 report counted 5,272 people killed in violence over five months, and Yiaga Africa has warned that insecurity could disrupt the 2027 elections. In much of the North-West, North-East, and Middle Belt, voters may judge the government first by whether they can travel safely to the polling unit.

*Bottom line*

Cash transfers can help the poor, and that should be acknowledged. But in Nigeria they will only be trusted if the money is traceable, the rules are public, and no one can use the register as a political asset. The government has the figures to make that case. What it has not yet shown is the list. Until it does, every payment will be received with gratitude and questioned with suspicion, and the ruling party will carry the cost of that suspicion into 2027.